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Abstract
The swing voters curse is useful for explaining patterns of voter participa-
tion, but arises because voters restrict attention to the rare event of a pivotal
vote. Recent empirical evidence suggests that electoral margins inuence pol-
icy outcomes, even away from the 50% threshold. If so, voters should also pay
attention to the marginal impact of a vote. Adopting this assumption, we nd
that a marginal voters curse gives voters a new reason to abstain, to avoid
diluting the pool of information. The two curses have similar origins and ex-
hibit similar patterns, but the marginal voters curse is both stronger and more
robust. In fact, the swing voters curse turns out to be knife-edge: in large
elections, a model with both pivotal and marginal considerations and a model
with marginal considerations alone generate identical equilibrium behavior.
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1 Introduction
Standard models of elections restrict attention to the mechanical impact of a
vote, which is that it can be pivotal in changing the identity of an election winner,
by making or breaking a tie. Empirically, however, it seems that votes may also
exert a marginal inuence on policy outcomes, by adjusting the balance between
political parties in power. Claiming a mandate from voters, for example, U.S.
presidents who win by larger margins pursue more major policy changes (Conley,
2001). When members of Congress win reelection by larger margins, they have more
partisan voting records (Faravelli, Man, and Walsh, 2015).1 With legislative rules
such as Proportional Representation, larger electoral margins shift the balance of
power mechanically, by altering the composition of a legislature. Slight increases in
a partys power can be important, even when that party has more than 50% of the
power: in the most recent legislative session, the U.S. Republican party lacked the
political strength for desired health and immigration legislation in spite of control-
ling both houses of Congress and the presidency, but presumably would have been
successful with a larger majority. For any of these reasons, the relationship between
electoral margins and policy outcomes may be as Figure 1 illustrates, where crossing
the 50% threshold shifts the policy outcome discontinuously, but policies respond
to electoral margins even away from this threshold. If so, then every vote has a
small but direct impact on the policy outcome, since every vote slightly increases or
decreases the winning partys margin of victory.
In a seminal paper, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) derive an important implica-
tion of the standard pivotal voting calculus, which is that voters who lack information
about available policy alternatives have a strategic incentive to abstain from voting,
e¤ectively delegating their decision to voters with superior information.2 This is use-
ful for explaining why voters often deliberately abstain, even in settings where voting
1Fowler (2005) shows that parties that win by large margins also nominate more extreme candi-
dates in subsequent elections. Bernhard et al. (2008) nd that senators who win by larger margins
moderate less in the two years before the subsequent election. Fowler (2006) also shows that bond
market investors expect larger policy changes after landslide election outcomes.
2This relates to pivotal voting because, when a voter expects others to make an informed decision,
his own vote will change the election outcome precisely when he has mistakenly voted for the inferior
policy alternative.
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Figure 1: Mapping between vote shares and policy outcomes.
is costless, for example by casting incomplete ballots, and has been corroborated by
extensive evidence that voters become more likely to vote when their information
improves.3 Since voters are only willing to rely on othersexpertise when they share
a common objective, that paper has also led to a resurgence of the classic common in-
terest paradigm of Condorcet (1785), where elections serve to pool information rather
than resolve conicts of interest.4 However, if voting also exerts a marginal impact
on policy outcomes, as in Figure 1, then voters should take this into account, meaning
that the standard pivotal voting calculus is wrong or at least incomplete.
This paper proposes the rst common interest model of voter turnout that takes
both the pivotal and the marginal impact of a vote into account.5 We include pivotal
3For reviews of this empirical literature, see Triossi (2013) and McMurray (2015). In particular,
turnout and roll-o¤ are both correlated with political knowledge and with other variables associated
with information, such as education and age. Lassen (2005), Banerjee et al. (2011), and Hogh and
Larsen (2016) present evidence that the impact of information on voter participation is causal.
4For example, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998, 1999), Piketty (1999), Myerson (2002),
Razin (2003), Martinelli (2006), Krishna and Morgan (2011), Ahn and Oliveros (2012, 2016), Bou-
ton and Castanheira (2012), Bhattacharya (2013), McMurray (2013, 2017a,b, 2018a,b), Ekmekci
and Lauermann (2016), Osborne, Rosenthal, and Stewart (2016), Ali, Mihm, and Siga (2017),
Barelli, Bhattacharya, and Siga (2017), Battaglini (2017), and Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Mal-
herbe (2018).
5McMurray (2017a) highlights how useful a common interest paradigm can be in explaining
patterns of voter behavior that are puzzling from a pure private interest perspective. With voter
participation, in particular, it is common for voters to worry that they know less than others, but as
noted above, such fears are only valid when there is a shared objective. The model below is not a
pure common interest model; as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), the interests of some citizens
are in conict. More general forms of heterogeneity are an important direction for future work.
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voting incentives by allowing the policy outcome to jump discontinuously when one
partys vote share crosses the 50% threshold, but importantly, we also allow votes to
have a marginal impact on the policy outcome away from this threshold, as depicted
in Figure 1. For a broad class of policy mappings, the main result is that citizens
with low (though still positive) levels of information abstain, even when voting is
costless. As long as a pivot remains at the 50% threshold, this is not surprising;
however, abstention also occurs even when this pivot is removed entirely. In that
case, voters abstain to avoid what we call the marginal voters curse of nudging the
policy in the wrong direction.
The marginal voters curse arises because the impact of an individuals vote is
diluted by the votes of like-minded citizens. The impact of a vote for the party that
is already leading is diluted more than the impact of a vote for the trailing party.
In a common interest environment, the superior party tends to be leading, which
means that voting for the correct alternative/party tends to have a smaller impact
on the policy outcome than voting for the inferior alternative/party has. With no
information about which party is superior, therefore, the benet of voting for either
party is negative, so a voter abstains in equilibrium, even if voting is costless. Unlike
the swing voters curse, which results from low-probability, high-impact events, the
marginal voters curse is generated by high-probability, low-impact events. In spite
of this contrast, however, both curses result from the same general underdog property,
whereby an additional vote for the leading party has smaller impact than an additional
vote for the losing party. The two curses thus exhibit similar comparative statics
with regard to the underlying distributions of voter preferences and information.
Intuitively, it might seem that comparing nudges in one direction or the other
would have less impact on voter beliefs than conditioning on an event with major
impact as a pivotal vote. However, the marginal voters curse turns out to be stronger
than the swing voters curse, in the sense that abstention is higher in a pure marginal
voting model than in a pure pivotal voting model.6 In a general model that includes
6This abstention with costless voting result is the opposite of that obtained in a costly voting
private value setting of Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey (2014), where abstention is higher in a pure
pivotal voting model than in a pure marginal voting model, as long as support for the two parties
is not precisely balanced.
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both pivotal and marginal considerations, of course, both curses operate. As the
number of votes grows large, however, the importance of pivotal voting considerations
also shrinks compared to marginal voting considerations. In the limit, then, even
though the marginal impact of a vote is minimal, voter participation converges to
the same level that would prevail if there were no discontinuity at all at the 50%
threshold. In other words, a model that includes both pivotal and marginal voting
considerations makes the same predictions for large elections as a model with marginal
voting considerations alone. In that sense, ignoring marginal voting incentives not
only fails to capture an aspect of elections that is relevant empirically; it also generates
predictions that turn out to be knife-edge in a more general setting.
While this paper focuses on pure common interest voters in addition to private
interest voters, a number of existing papers analyze voter participation in light of the
marginal impact of voting, but in a purely private interest setting.7 Others study
participation in common interest elections, but focus only on pivotal voting.8 In a
common interest setting, Razin (2003) considers a model where political parties share
votersinterests, and voluntarily adjust their policy positions to utilize information
revealed by electoral margins. Introducing abstention into that model, McMurray
(2017b) shows that relatively uninformed citizens abstain to avoid the signaling
voters curseof conveying misleading information. In contrast, the marginal voters
curse arises with a mapping from vote shares to policy outcomes that is purely me-
chanical. As explained below, this could reect adjustments in the balance of power
between parties that do not share votersinterests, or hold overcondent policy be-
liefs. Together, the swing voters curse, signaling voters curse, and marginal voters
curse make clear that common interest and heterogeneous expertise generate strategic
abstention for a variety of institutional details.
The organization of this paper is simple. Section 2 introduces the formal model,
and Section 3 analyzes equilibrium incentives for voter participation, rst for elections
of arbitrary size and then in the limit as the electorate grows large. For simplicity, this
7For example, see Castanheira (2003), Shotts (2006), Meirowitz and Shotts (2009), Herrera,
Morelli, and Palfrey (2014), Faravelli, Man, and Walsh (2015), Faravelli and Sanchez-Pages (2015),
Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari (2015) and Kartal (2015).
8For example, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), Krishna and Morgan (2011, 2012),
and McMurray (2013).
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analysis assumes that policies (aside from the discontinuity at 50%) depend linearly
on the vote share. Section 3.3 then shows that the same results hold for a broad class
of general policy functions, as well, such as the one pictured in Figure 1. Section 4
concludes, and proofs of theoretical results are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
An electorate consists of N citizens where N is nite but unknown, and follows a
Poisson distribution with mean n.9 Together, these citizens must choose a policy from
an interval. There are two political parties, each with policy positions in the interval.
At the beginning of the game, and with equal probability, Nature designates one of
these policy positions as better for society than the other. Let A denote the party
with the superior position and B denote the party with the inferior position. Letting
0 denote the inferior policy position and 1 denote the superior position, x 2 [0; 1]
can denote any policy between the two partiespositions and also the social welfare
u (x) = x that will be attained if that policy is implemented.
Citizens are each independently designated as one of two types. With probability
2p, a citizen is a partisan, and has a vested interest in promoting one party or the
other (each with probability p), regardless of which policy position Nature designated
as superior. With remaining probability I = 1   2p, a citizen is independent or
non-partisan. Independents prefer to do whatever is socially optimal, evaluating
policy x according to the welfare function u (x) given above. From an independents
perspective, each of his fellow citizens has probability p of being a partisan supporter
of the superior party A and probability p of being a partisan supporter of the inferior
party B. Let a and b denote the numbers of votes cast for either party and + = aa+b
and   = ba+b denote the partiesvote shares (where + =   =
1
2
if a = b = 0).
The most standard assumption is that the policy outcome x is simply given by
9This follows Myerson (1998). A known population size is unrealistic, and generates pathological
equilibria, where voters play weakly dominated strategies, knowing that their votes will not be
pivotal. If N is odd, the swing voters curse also needs not arise, as a tie conveys no information
about the state variable. Poisson uncertainty substantially simplies the analysis, especially in
deriving the limiting probabilities of pivotal events.
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the policy position xw 2 fxA; xBg of the party w who wins the election (i.e. 0 if b > a
and 1 if a > b, breaking a tie if necessary by a fair coin toss). Alternatively, the
ultimate policy outcome might be a product of bargaining between the two parties.10
If a partys bargaining power is determined by its vote share, for example, the policy
outcome might be given by the weighted average 0 ( ) + 1 (+) = +.11 We refer to
these cases as pure pivotal voting and pure marginal voting, respectively, and assume
more generally that the policy outcome (and welfare) are given by the weighted
average
x = + + (1  )xw (1)
of these two extremes. As in Figure 1, policy then shifts discontinuously when one
partys vote share crosses the 50% threshold, but even away from this threshold,
changes in one partys vote share push the policy outcome marginally in that partys
direction.12
The optimal policy cannot be observed directly, but independent voters observe
private signals si that are informative of Natures choice.13 These signals are of
heterogeneous quality, reecting the fact that citizens di¤er in their expertise on
the issue at hand. Specically, each citizen is endowed with information quality
qi 2 Q = [0; 1], drawn independently according to a common distribution F which,
for simplicity, is continuous and has full support. Conditional on qi = q, a citizens
signal correctly identies the party whose policy position is truly superior with the
10McMurray (2017b) assumes parties to be like independent voters, favoring policies as close as
possible to the state variable. With no need to bargain, the winning side voluntarily calibrates
its policy position to account for the strength of evidence for and against its side. Here, parties
are better thought of as partisan voters, favoring extreme policies but for lack of bargaining power.
Alternatively, the same specication applies if parties share independent votersinterests but hold
overcondent beliefs, as in McMurray (2018a).
11This is the welfare outcome if independent voters are risk neutral, and parties implement their
preferred policies 0 and 1 with probabilities   and +. It could also result from a bargaining
model with alternating o¤ers, where vote shares determine the probability of being able to o¤er the
next proposal. Alternatively, it could result from probabilistic voting across independent legislative
districts, as in Levy and Razin (2015).
12The specication in (1) constrains the policy function to be linear in the vote share (with slope
). Section 3.3 extends this to more general functional forms, such as that illustrated in Figure 1.
13Partisans could receive signals as well, of course, but would ignore them in equilibrium.
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following probability.
Pr (si = Ajq) = 1
2
(1 + q) (2)
With complementary probability, a citizen mistakes the inferior party for the superior
party.
Pr (si = Bjq) = 1
2
(1  q) (3)
With this specication, qi can be interpreted as the correlation coe¢ cient between
a voters private opinion and the truth. That is, a signal with qi = 1 perfectly
reveals Natures choice while a signal with qi = 0 is completely uninformative. An
independent can vote (at no cost) for the party that he perceives to be superior, or
can abstain.14 Let  : Q ! [0; 1] denote a (mixed) participation strategy, where
 (q) denotes the probability of voting for an individual with expertise q 2 Q, and
let  denote the set of such strategies. If he votes for his signal, a voters posterior
belief that he has correctly voted for the superior party or mistakenly voted for the
inferior party are given simply by the right-hand sides of (2) and (3), respectively, by
Bayesrule.
As an example of political decisions that might t the structure outlined here,
consider any division of funding between two programs with a common objective, such
as using education money either to increase teacher salaries or to reduce class sizes
or, at higher levels, using tax revenue to strengthen either the military or the social
safety net. At either level, some voters simply have a vested interest in one program or
the other, and vote accordingly, but others support whichever policy they believe will
be truly best for the group. Interior policies represent various possible compromises
that partially fund both programs, and can result from bargaining between parties
with di¤erent levels of power, but if truth were known, independent voters would
prefer to fully fund whichever program is more productive over any such compromise,
and may vote with an eye toward increasing the bargaining power of the party whose
policy proposal seems superior.
Given a participation strategy, the probabilities with which a citizen votes for
14A strategy of voting against ones signal could be allowed but would not be used in equilibrium.
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party A and party B, respectively, are given by the following.
v+ = p+ I
Z 1
0
 (q)
1
2
(1 + q) dF (q) (4)
v  = p+ I
Z 1
0
 (q)
1
2
(1  q) dF (q) (5)
These include the probability p of favoring either party for partisan reasons, as well as
the probabilities of voting as an independent with any level of expertise. Together,
(4) and (5) also determine the level v = v+ + v  of voter turnout.
If every citizen follows the same participation strategy, (4) and (5) can be inter-
preted as the expected vote shares of the superior and inferior parties, respectively.
By the decomposition property of Poisson random variables (Myerson 1998), the
numbers a and b of votes for the superior and inferior parties, respectively, are inde-
pendent Poisson random variables with means n+ = nv+ and n  = nv . Thus, the
probability of exactly a votes for the superior party and b votes for the inferior party
is the product
Pr (a; b) =
e n+na+
a!
e n nb 
b!
(6)
of Poisson probabilities. Similarly, the expected total number of votes can be written
as nv.
By the environmental equivalence property of Poisson games (Myerson 1998), an
individual from within the game reinterprets a and b as the numbers of correct and
incorrect votes cast by his peers; by voting himself, he might add one to either total.
When there are a votes for the superior party and b votes for the inferior party, the
change in utility +x (a; b) from contributing one additional vote for the superior
party and the change in utility  x (a; b) from adding one vote for the inferior party
are given by the following.
+x (a; b) = x (a+ 1; b)  x (a; b) (7)
 x (a; b) = x (a; b+ 1)  x (a; b) (8)
The magnitudes of these utility changes depend on the numbers of votes cast for either
8
side by a citizens peers; averaging over all possible voting outcomes, the expected
benet of voting is given by
Eu (q) = Ea;b

1
2
(1 + q) +x (a; b) +
1
2
(1  q)  x (a; b)

(9)
which depends on a citizens expertise q. Implicitly, the expectation in (9) depends on
the voting strategy adopted by a citizens peers. If his peers all follow the strategy
 2 , a citizens best response is to vote if his q is such that (9) is positive and
to abstain otherwise. A strategy  that is its own best response constitutes a
(symmetric) Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. Section 3 now analyzes the
properties of such equilibria, rst generically and then for large electorates, and then
extends the model to more general relationships between vote totals and the policy
outcome.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Finite elections
The potential benet of voting lies in a voters ability to bring the policy outcome
closer to the policy that is truly optimal. The potential damage of voting lies in the
possibility that the voter will accidentally push the policy outcome away from what
is optimal. Whether the net expected benet of voting (9) is positive or negative
therefore depends on how condent a voter is that his vote will push the policy
outcome in the right direction, and this condence increases with a voters expertise
q. Accordingly, best response voting follows a quality threshold strategy, dened in
Denition 1, meaning simply that su¢ ciently expert voters vote, while those who
lack expertise abstain. As Proposition 1 now states, this characterizes equilibrium,
as well, and a standard xed point argument on the interval of possible thresholds
guarantees equilibrium existence.
Denition 1  2  is a quality threshold strategy (with quality threshold ) if
 (q) = 1q .
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Proposition 1 If  2  is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium then it is a quality threshold
strategy, with quality threshold   > 0. Moreover, such an equilibrium exists.
Denition 1 allows the possibility that  = 0, meaning that all citizens vote. In
equilibrium, however, Proposition 1 states that   > 0, meaning that the fraction
F ( ) of independent voters who abstain is positive. For the case of  = 0, the logic
for this is the swing voters curse, familiar from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and
McMurray (2013): the party whose policy position is truly superior is more likely to
win by one vote than to lose by one vote, so one additional vote for this party is less
likely to be pivotal than one additional vote for the opposing party. Since a mistake
is more likely to have impact than a correct vote, a voter who has no information
strictly prefers to abstain. By continuity, voters with near-zero expertise prefer to
abstain, as well.
For the case of  = 1, the impact of a vote is entirely marginal, so pivotal events
no longer matter. In that case, the swing voters curse does not arise. Nevertheless,
Proposition 1 states that   > 0 in that case as well, implying that a positive fraction
of the electorate still abstain. They do so to avoid the marginal voters curse of
pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. For intermediate values of ,
both curses operate.
Like the swing voters curse, the marginal voters curse arises because the damage
a voter will inict if he is in error exceeds the benet his vote will generate if his private
opinion is correct, so an uninformed voter and, by continuity, a poorly informed
voter prefers to abstain. The key observation is that the impact of a vote gets
diluted when others vote the same way. This means that one additional vote for the
losing side has greater impact on the margin of victory than one additional vote for
the winning side has. If one alternative receives three out of ve votes, for example,
or a 60% vote share, then an additional vote for the winning party increases this vote
share by seven percentage points (i.e. to 67%, or four out of six) but an additional vote
for the losing party decreases the winning partys vote share by ten percentage points
(i.e. to 50%, or three out of six). As before, this matters because the party whose
policy position is truly superior is more likely to be ahead than behind. Thus, one
additional vote for the inferior party should have greater impact than an additional
10
vote for the superior party.
The result that independent voters each receive informative private signals but
not all report their signals in equilibrium implies that valuable information is lost.
Intuitively, this may seem to justify e¤orts to increase voter participation, for example
by punishing non-voters with stigma or nes. However, McLennan (1998) shows that,
in common interest environments such as this, whatever is socially optimal is also
individually optimal, implying that equilibrium abstention in this setting actually
improves welfare. To see how it can be welfare improving to throw away signals,
note that citizens actually have not one but two pieces of private information: their
signal realization si and their expertise qi. In an ideal electoral system, all signal
realizations would be utilized, but would be weighted according to their underlying
expertise. Here, however, votes that are cast are all weighted equally. Whether
the impact of a vote is pivotal or marginal, abstention provides a crude mechanism
whereby citizens can transfer weight from the lowest quality signals to those that
reect better expertise.
3.2 Large elections
The analysis above applies for elections of arbitrary size. In most elections,
however, n is quite large. Accordingly, Proposition 2, below, characterizes behavior
of voters in the limit as n!1. Not surprisingly, the quality threshold structure of
voting persists. Moreover, the limiting threshold  1 is unique. This means that,
if multiple equilibria exist in nite elections (a possibility which Proposition 1 does
not exclude), they all converge when n is large.15 A unique quality threshold also
translates into a unique level of turnout 1   F ( 1). Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition
2 state further that the unique limiting threshold lies strictly between 0 and 1 (for
all but one parameter combination, as explained below), implying that the fractions
of independent voters who vote and abstain both remain substantial, no matter how
large the electorate grows.
15For pure pivotal voting, uniqueness in the limit requires that the density of expertise be suf-
ciently spread out, as McMurray (2013) explains. A su¢ cient condition for this is that f is
log-concave, meaning that ln (f) is concave. This condition is unnecessary for the cases of  > 0.
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A unique limit facilitates meaningful comparative static comparisons for changes
in model parameters. Part 3 of Proposition 2 states that adding partisans to the
electorate reduces the limiting participation threshold for independents. This in-
creases participation among independents and, since partisans always vote, increases
participation overall. Part 4 considers an overall improvement in voter information,
in terms of the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), as dened in Deni-
tion 2, and states that such an improvement raises the limiting equilibrium quality
threshold. By themselves, lifting voters above the limiting quality threshold would
increase turnout, but raising the threshold would lower turnout; when both occur,
the net a¤ect is ambiguous.16
Denition 2 Let F denote the set of distribution functions on [0; 1]. If F 2 F and
G 2 F have densities f and g then F <MLRP G if g(x)f(x) increases in x. A function
h : F ! R is increasing if F <MLRP G implies that h (F ) < h (G).
Proposition 2 If f is log-concave then there exists a unique quality threshold  1
such that limn!1  n = 

1 for any sequence (

n) of equilibrium quality thresholds.
Moreover,  1 satises the following (for all (p; ; F ), unless otherwise specied).
(1)  1 > 0
(2)  1 < 1 if and only if (p; ) 6= (0; 1)
(3)  1 decreases with p
(4)  1 increases with F
The logic behind Proposition 2 is that, for any quality threshold  , the proof
of Proposition 1 denes another quality threshold  brn () that characterizes its best
response. As n grows large, realized vote shares converge to their expectations, and
 brn () converges to a unique limit, 
br
1 (). Given the continuity of utility, a sequence
of equilibrium thresholds  n must converge to a xed point of 
br
1. For the case of
pure pivotal voting, the proof that  br1 has exactly one xed point follows McMurray
16All of the parts of this proposition are also proven by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and
McMurray (2013), but only for the case of  = 0. Extending to  > 0 is useful because it shows
that the empirical applications of those papers remain valid even if the full impact of a vote is not
limited to pivotal events. The proof below is also more intuitive.
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(2013). For pure marginal voting, the proof of Proposition 2 rewrites the xed point
condition  br1 () =  as equation (??), which is equivalent to the following.
+ () =
v+ ()
v+ () + v  ()
=
1
2
(1 + ) (10)
A key observation is that equation (10) is also the rst-order condition for maximizing
+ (). Once the left- and right-hand sides of (10) cross, therefore, the former
decreases and the latter increases in  , preventing additional intersections. Figure 2
illustrates this for a particular levels of partisanship, and for a uniform distribution
of expertise.
The result that equating the left- and right-hand sides of (10) also maximizes
+ is intuitive in light of McLennans (1998) observation that, in a common interest
setting such as this, whatever is socially optimal is also individually optimal, and can
therefore prevail in equilibrium. After all, when voters follow the quality threshold
strategy  , + () can be interpreted as the fraction of voters who correctly vote
for the superior party. The right-hand side of (10) gives the posterior belief of a
voter with expertise q =  exactly at the threshold, which is also the probability
that this voter will vote correctly for the superior party. When  is so low that the
marginal voter has a lower probability of voting correctly than the average voter has,
the marginal voter prefers to abstain in response. When  is so high that the marginal
voter is more likely to vote correctly than an average voter, he strictly prefers to vote.
In equilibrium, of course, the marginal voter must be indi¤erent between voting and
abstaining.17
With pure pivotal voting, the proof of Proposition 2 rewrites the xed point
condition  br1 () =  as equation (??), which is equivalent to the following.p
v+ ()p
v+ () +
p
v  ()
=
1
2
(1 + ) (11)
Like (10), the right-hand side of (11) gives the posterior belief of the marginal voter
17This logic for why equating average and marginal probabilities maximizes the average is the
same reasoning behind the familiar result in industrial organization, that average costs are minimized
when they equal marginal costs.
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Figure 2: Left- and righ-hand side of equation (10) for di¤erent levels of partisanship.
that is, the strength of evidence of his own private information. FromMyerson (2000),
the left-hand side of (11) can be interpreted as the limit of the probability Pr (P jP)
that a vote for the inferior party is pivotal (event P ), given that either a vote for
the inferior party or a vote for the superior party is pivotal (event P). Since his
peers are more likely to elect the superior party by one vote than the inferior party
by one vote, a mistaken vote is more likely to be pivotal than a correct vote, and the
left-hand side of (11) can be interpreted as the strength of evidence that a voter is
mistaken, conditional on his vote being pivotal in one direction or the other. If the
probability of a mistake, conditional on being pivotal, is greater than the probability
of a voters own signal being correct (i.e., if the left-hand side of (11) exceeds the
right-hand side) then a voter should abstain; otherwise (i.e., if the right-hand side
exceeds the left-hand side), he should vote with his signal.18
18Equation (11) can be written equivalently as follows.
1
2
(1  )
p
v+ ()p
v+ () +
p
v  ()
j 1j = 1
2
(1 + )
p
v  ()p
v+ () +
p
v  ()
j1j
The left-hand side of this expression is the cost of voting in a large election: the marginal probability
1
2 (1 + ) of a mistaken opinion, times the limiting probability
p
v+()p
v+()+
p
v ()
of being pivotal in the
wrong direction (conditional on being pivotal at all), times the magnitude j 1j of the utility impact
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The result that equilibrium behavior under pure marginal voting asymptotically
maximizes the marginal voting objective raises the question of whether equilibrium
behavior under pure pivotal voting also asymptotically maximizes the pure pivotal
objective. Indeed, this turns out to be the case, which existing literature on com-
mon interest elections seems not to have noted: for large n, Myerson (2002) shows
that the probability with which the superior party wins a majority election is of or-
der e n(
p
v+ pv )2 , and the rst-order condition for maximizing this quantity is none
other than (11). Thus, equilibrium behavior under marginal voting serves to maxi-
mize the superior partys margin of victory, and equilibrium behavior under pivotal
voting serves to maximize the superior partys probability of winning. Whether the
impact of a vote is pivotal or marginal or some hybrid of the two, the location of
the equilibrium quality threshold trades o¤ the quality and the quantity of private
information reported by voters: a high threshold aggregates the signals that are best
informed, while a low threshold aggregates a larger number of signals. The logic be-
hind Part 3 of Proposition 2 is simply that, as the electorate becomes more partisan,
there is a greater need for a large quantity of independent votes, to make sure that
the electoral decision is made by independents, not partisans.
With pure pivotal voting, the quantity of information still matters when there
are no partisans, as McMurray (2013) explains, because the expected outcome is a
vote share higher than 50% for the superior party, and additional votes reduce the
variance around this expectation, ensuring that a vote share below 50% doesnt occur
by mistake. With marginal voting, it is still valuable to ensure that the realized vote
of changing the policy outcome from good to bad. The right-hand side is the benet of voting: the
marginal probability 12 (1  ) of a mistaken opinion, times the limiting probability
p
v ()p
v+()+
p
v ()
of being pivotal in the right direction (conditional on being pivotal at all), times the magnitude j1j of
the utility impact of changing the policy outcome from bad to good. Thus, the limiting equilibrium
condition can be seen simply as equating the cost and benet for the marginal voter. Equation (10)
can be similarly rewritten as equating costs and benets for the marginal voter.
1
2
(1  ) (1) v+ ()
v+ () + v  ()
=
1
2
(1 + ) (1)
v  ()
v+ () + v  ()
With marginal voting, however, the probability of inuencing the electoral outcome is (1), and
the (relative) utility impact of a correct vote and a mistaken vote are given by v ()v+()+v () and
v+()
v+()+v ()
, respectively.
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share is not too far below its expectation, but shrinking the variance also ensures that
the realized vote share is not too far above its expectation, either, and this is unde-
sirable. With linear utility, these positive and negative outcomes exactly cancel out.
Thus, quantity is not particularly of value. In very small elections, poorly informed
voters participate just to ensure that somebody votes, as n grows large, a voter who
was previously right at the participation threshold now abstains, to avoid casting the
noisiest vote. As voters become increasingly selective on quality, voter exit prompts
more voter exit, and an unraveling occurs. In the limit, Part 2 of Proposition 2
states that the equilibrium participation threshold approaches the upper bound of
the distribution of expertise, so that everyone abstains except a vanishing fraction of
the most elite voters, who are most nearly infallible.19 In this way, voters ensure
that the superior party will not only win, but win with as large a margin as possible,
which is what matters when the policy outcome responds to the marginal impact of
a vote. These results are illustrated in Figure 3, which displays participation rates
for independent voters under di¤erent parameter congurations, assuming a uniform
distribution of expertise. Part 4 of Proposition 2 follows from similar reasoning:
as othersinformation improves, an individual becomes more inclined to abstain, in
deference to those who know more.20
Intuitively, it might seem that conditioning on the event a pivotal vote should have
a much greater impact on behavior than conditioning on the marginal impact of a
nudge in one direction or the other especially in large elections, where a pivotal vote
is such a special event, and where the magnitude of the nudge is vanishingly small. If
so, abstention should be much higher and turnout much lower under pure pivotal
voting than under pure marginal voting, and in large elections, the swing voters
curse should dominate voters participation decisions. To the contrary, however,
Proposition 3 now states that it is the marginal voters curse that is stronger, in the
sense that abstention is higher for  = 1 than for  = 0, for any level of partisanship.21
19Log-concavity is not required for that result.
20Since improved information lifts some non-voters above the participation threshold but leads
some voters to abstain in deference to now-more reliable peers, the net e¤ect on voter turnout is
ambiguous.
21If f is not log-concave then a solution to (11) need not be unique, but Proposition 3 holds for
any limit point 1 (p; 0; F ) of a sequence of equilibrium thresholds.
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Figure 3: Turnout among independent voters as a function of the partisan share (2p)
when the distribution F of expertise is uniform.
Moreover, intermediate values of  generate equilibrium behavior that converges in
large elections to be identical to the case of pure marginal voting. In that sense,
both curses operate in equilibrium, but as the electorate grows large, participation
and abstention are determined entirely by the marginal voters curse. The swing
voters curse can then be seen as a knife-edge result, in that any non-zero weight on
the marginal impact of a vote snaps the equilibrium abruptly away from the case of
 = 0.
Proposition 3  1 (p; 0; F ) < 

1 (p; ; F ) = 

1 (p; 1; F ) for any (p; ; F ) with  > 0.
Mathematically, Proposition 3 follows because, for any  , the left-hand side of (10)
exceeds the left-hand side of (11), so equation (10) yields a higher xed point. In-
tuitively, the reason that abstention is higher for pure marginal voting than for pure
pivotal voting is that mistakes are more costly, because of the dilution problem de-
scribed above, and the need to vote as unanimously as possible. With pure pivotal
voting, a single mistake can be remedied by a single correct vote for the party with
the superior policy position. The same is not true when margins matter, because
vote shares become diluted, so a vote for the majority party has a lower impact on
policy than a vote for the minority. As a simple illustration of this, suppose that the
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superior party received three out of ve votes, or a 60% vote share. One additional
vote for the opposite party reduces this vote share to 50% (three out of six), and an
additional vote of support brings it back up, but only to 57% (four out of seven).
Thus, it takes more than one vote to compensate for one mistaken vote. In that
sense, mistakes are more permanent when a vote has a marginal impact on policy
than when it doesnt, and voters work harder to avoid them. The marginal impact
of a vote decays linearly as the number of voters grows large, but the probability of
casting a pivotal vote decays exponentially, so in large elections, marginal considera-
tions dominate. This is why intermediate values of  generate equilibrium behavior
that is identical in the limit to the case of pure marginal voting,  = 1.
Propositions 2 and 3 analyze how changes in model parameters impact the equilib-
rium threshold and voter participation. Proposition 4 now analyzes how such changes
impact welfare, which can be measured by a single independent voters utility, since
partisan interests are zero-sum and are balanced by assumption. Pure pivotal voting
in large elections perfectly implements the superior policy, and this does not depend
on the distribution of expertise or the size of partisan shares. With pure marginal
voting or intermediate values of , which are asymptotically equivalent welfare is
lower, unless there are no partisans.22 In general, welfare improves as voter informa-
tion improves, and decreases with the expected partisan share p.
Proposition 4 Let u1 = limn!1E [u (x

n)]. If  = 0 then u

1 = 1. If  > 0 then
u1 increases in F and decreases in p , with u

1 =
(
1 if p = 0
1
2
if p = 1
2
.
That improving voter information improves welfare is intuitive. That partisans
have a negative impact under pure marginal voting but no impact at all under pure
pivotal voting relates again to the dilution principle described above. With pivotal
voting, an additional A partisan and an additional B partisan simply nullify each
others votes, leaving independents to wield the same inuence as before. With mar-
ginal voting, however, adding equal numbers of partisan votes on either side dilutes
22Even with no partisans, the result that u1 = 1 for  > 0 relies on the assumption that q has full
support; more generally, asymptotic welfare equals the posterior 12 (1 + qmax) of the best informed
members of the electorate.
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the impact of non-partisan votes. When three out of ve independents make the
right decision and there are no partisans, for example, the superior party receives
60% of the votes. With one partisan on each side, this drops to 57% (or four out of
seven); with two partisans on each side, it drops to 56% (or ve out of nine). The
more partisans there are, the more di¢ cult it becomes for the electorate to be united
in the direction of truth.
3.3 General Policy Functions
Using the parameter , the policy function described in Section 2 can be written
as a single function x =  (a; b) of vote totals a and b,
x =  (a; b) =
8><>:
a
a+b
 + 0 (1  ) if a < b
a
a+b
 + 1
2
(1  ) if a = b
a
a+b
 + 1 (1  ) if a > b
(12)
which includes pure pivotal voting, pure marginal voting, and mixtures as special
cases. This particular policy specication is special, however, in that the marginal
voting component is simply linear in the vote share + = aa+b . The purpose of this
section is to show that the results above hold for much more general functional forms,
as well, such as that pictured in Figure 1. Specically, Proposition 5 below states a
su¢ cient condition for a positive fraction of the electorate to abstain in equilibrium,
which is that the policy function  satises Conditions 1 through 3.
Condition 1 (Monotonicity)  (a; b) increases in a and decreases in b.
Condition 2 (Symmetry) For any a; b 2 Z+,  (b; a) = 1   (a; b).
Condition 3 (Underdog property) j (a; b+ 1)   (a; b)j  
j (a+ 1; b)   (a; b)j has the same sign as a  b.
Monotonicity merely states that A and B votes push the policy outcome toward 1
and 0 and therefore increase and decrease utility, respectively. Symmetry implies that
reversing the numbers of votes that each party receives exactly reverses the parties
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power, for example implying that  (a; b) = 1
2
when a = b. The underdog property
states that the impact of one additional vote for the party that has fewer votes is
greater than the impact of one additional vote for the party with a majority. This
property is satised by (12), including for the extreme cases of pure pivotal or pure
marginal voting, but also holds for a much broader class of policy functions. If  
is any monotonic and symmetric function of the vote share + = aa+b , for example,
then Condition 3 holds if  is S-shaped that is, convex for vote shares in

0; 1
2

and concave for vote shares in

1
2
; 1

meaning that the vote share has a diminishing
marginal impact on the majority partys power. Contestfunctions of the form
 (a; b) =
az
az + bz
=

1 +

1
+
  1
z 1
satisfy Condition 3, as well, and are S-shaped for z > 1 but an inverted S-shape (i.e.
concave and then convex) for z < 1.
Proposition 5 If  : Z2+ ! [0; 1] satises Conditions 1 through 3 then  2  is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium only if it is a quality threshold strategy  with   > 0.
Moreover, such an equilibrium exists.
Fundamentally, the logic of Proposition 5 is the same as the logic of Proposition 1:
a voter with no private information is equally likely to make the policy outcome better
or worse, but the underdog property implies that an additional vote for the trailing
party will have greater impact than an additional vote for the leader, and when others
vote informatively, the trailing party is likely to be inferior.
The substantive assumption reected in the underdog property is crowding out.
That is, the impact of an individuals vote is smaller, the more people there are voting
with him. To see this, rewrite the case of pure marginal voting as follows,
 (a; b) =
1
2
+
1
2
a  b
a+ b
(13)
thereby making clear that deviations from 1
2
are proportional to the electoral margin,
which is proportional to the vote di¤erential but inversely proportional to the total
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number of votes. Next, consider an alternative policy function,
 (a; b) =
1
2
+
1
2
a  b
a+ b
a+ b
N
=
1
2
+
1
2
a  b
N
(14)
where deviations from 1
2
are in proportion to the electoral margin a b
a+b
, but also to
the turnout rate a+b
N
.23 The product of these is proportional to the vote di¤erential
but inversely proportional to the total number N of voters and non-voters combined,
which remains constant no matter how many votes are cast. Equations (13) and
(14) thus have similar structure, but the latter does not satisfy Condition 3. With a
constant marginal impact, voters no longer have any reason to abstain. Which type
of function more closely matches a particular electoral setting is an open question.
De jure, we are not aware of any electoral rules that are explicit functions of turnout;
de facto, however, it may well be that mandates are stronger when turnout is higher.24
In discussing the shape of  , this section has maintained the assumption
of linear utility. With more exotic utility functions, Condition 3 would have
to be augmented to require that the di¤erence ju [ (a; b+ 1)]  u [ (a; b)]j  
ju [ (a+ 1; b)]  u [ (a; b)]j in utility have the same sign as a  b. In that sense, the
underdog condition is as much a restriction on preferences as it is on the mapping
from vote shares to policy outcomes. In contrast, the swing voters curse does not
impose any restriction on utility, except that policy 1 is preferred to policy 0, because
when voting is purely pivotal, only these two policy outcomes are possible, so the
shape of u over intermediate policy outcomes is irrelevant.
4 Conclusion
That voters should focus on the rare event of a pivotal vote is often viewed as the
central hallmark of rationality in models of elections. In common interest settings,
23We thank an anonymous referee for this example.
24McMurray (2017b) models mandates as a Bayesian reaction by candidates to voter information.
In that setting, electoral margins indeed imply stronger mandates when turnout is higher, because
adding signals in the same proportion as existing signals strengthens a candidates beliefs, leading
her to put less weight on her prior. Abstention then still occurs, however, because of the signaling
voters curse, as voters try to manipulate the message that is being sent.
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this has been shown to have dramatic consequences for voting behavior, including
the swing voters curse, which has been useful for explaining patterns of voter partic-
ipation. Embracing the common interest paradigm but assuming, in light of recent
evidence, that margins of victory matter even away from the 50% threshold, this
paper has discovered a new strategic incentive for abstention, the marginal voters
curse. The two curses exhibit similar patterns, and both are manifestations of the
same underdog property, whereby votes from like-minded voters crowd out an indi-
viduals inuence on the election outcome. In large elections, however, the marginal
voters curse is more severe, in that abstention is higher with pure marginal voting
than with pure pivotal voting. It is also more robust, in that marginal and pivotal
considerations together generate the same behavior as marginal considerations alone.
These predictions are conrmed empirically in the laboratory experiments of Herrera,
Llorente-Saguer, and McMurray (2018).
In legislative elections, Proportional Representation is a common alternative to
majority rule. With PR, changes to a partys vote share can matter even away from
the 50% threshold, as Section 1 notes, so that the standard pivotal voting calculus,
and therefore the swing voters curse, do not directly apply. Existing literature often
models PR as above, equating the policy outcome to a partys vote share. This does
not perfectly match the institutional details of PR, where number of legislative seats
is nite, but does capture the ideal that the composition of the legislature should
match the electorate as closely as possible. To the extent that the model of Section
2 accurately approximates PR, therefore, the marginal voters curse predicts that
strategic abstention should occur under PR, just as it does under majority rule. This
is useful because, empirically, Sobbrio and Navarra (2010) nd that poorly informed
voters in either system are more likely to abstain.25 Partial ballots seem just as
prevalent under PR as they are in majority rule. In the 2011 Peruvian national
elections, for example, 12% of those who went to the polls failed to cast valid votes
in the Presidential election (the rst round of a runo¤ system), but larger fractions,
namely 23% and 39% respectively, failed to vote in the PR elections for Congress and
for the Andean Parliament.26 Just as in majoritarian settings, a lack of information
25See also Riambau (2018).
26See the webpage of the Ocina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe).
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seems an intuitive rationale for such selective abstention.
Section 2 assumes that voters are equally likely to be A partisan or B partisan,
that the two parties are ex-ante equally likely to be superior, that private signals are
equally informative in either case, and that utility in the two states is symmetric.
Such symmetry keeps the analysis tractable, but asymmetries are relevant to many
applications, and so should be explored in future work. The model above also as-
sumes that truth is binary: the two partiespolicy positions are the best policy and
worst policy available. Given that assumption, it is not surprising that pivotal vot-
ing is superior to marginal voting, as it guarantees one of these extremes. In many
applications, however, the optimal policy may not be either extreme, but rather a
compromise between the two.27 In such situations, the welfare ranking in Propo-
sition 4 may well be reversed. To explore this possibility, future work should seek
extend the present model to additional truth states.28 In addition to these direc-
tions, future work should study richer forms of preference heterogeneity. The present
model mixes private and common values, but independents are perfectly unied, and
partisans do not care at all about the true state of the world; more generally, all
voters might have objectives that put some weight on their own interests, and some
weight on the common good.29
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Online Appendix
Online Appendix to the paper: The Marginal Voters Curseby H. Herrera, A.
Llorente-Saguer, and J. McMurray, published at the Economic Journal. This version:
November 2018. This le contains the proofs of the lemmas and propositions in the
paper.
Proof of Proposition 1. We establish this proposition rst for the case of pure
marginal voting,  = 1, then for the case of pure pivotal voting,  = 0, and nally for
the general case of  2 (0; 1). In all three cases, the rst step is to show that the best
response br to any voting strategy is a quality threshold strategy. If  = 1 then the
policy outcome x = + is simply the vote share of the party with the superior policy
position. Changes in utility (7) and (8) from an additional vote for the superior party
and from an additional vote for the inferior party can then be written as follows,
+x (a; b) =
a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
  a
a+ b
= + (15)
 x (a; b) =
a
a+ b+ 1
  a
a+ b
=    (16)
in terms of the increases + = a+1a+b+1   aa+b and   = b+1a+b+1   ba+b in these
vote shares that an additional correct vote or an additional incorrect vote cause,
respectively.
Since + and   are both positive, (9) is increasing in q, and is positive for
all q above the following threshold.
 br =
Ea;b ( )  Ea;b (+)
Ea;b ( ) + Ea;b (+)
(17)
In other words, the best response to  is a quality threshold strategy, with quality
threshold given by (17): a voter votes if his expertise exceeds  br, and abstains oth-
erwise. In particular, if his peers follow a quality threshold strategy with arbitrary
quality threshold  then a voters best response is another quality threshold strategy,
with quality threshold  br. Accordingly, (17) can be reinterpreted as an implicit func-
tion from the compact interval [0; 1] of possible thresholds into itself. The continuity
of (4) through (9) and + and   imply that  br () is continuous in  , so a xed
point   =  br ( ) exists by Brouwers theorem, and characterizes a quality threshold
strategy  =  that is its own best response, thus constituting a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
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The denominator of (17) is positive, and the numerator can be rewritten as follows.
Ea;b ( )  Ea;b (+) = Ea;b

b  a
a+ b+ 1
  b  a
a+ b

=
1X
b=0
1X
a=b

b  a
a+ b+ 1
  b  a
a+ b

[Pr (a; b)  Pr (b; a)]
The term in parentheses is positive, and from (6), the di¤erence in brackets can be
written as follows.
e n+na+
a!
e n nb 
b!
  e
 n+nb+
b!
e n na 
a!
=
e nvna+b
a!b!
 
va+v
b
    vb+va 

=
e nvna+b
a!b!
vb+v
b
 
 
va b+   va b 

For any strategy in which a positive fraction of the electorate votes, (4) and (5) make
clear that v+ > v , implying that this expression and therefore the numerator of (17)
are strictly positive, as well. That  br > 0 for any best response implies that   > 0
in equilibrium, as well, as claimed.
For the case of  = 0, or pure pivotal voting, the policy outcome is a random
variable xw that equals 0 if a < b, 1 if a > b, and 0 or 1 with equal probability if
a = b. A single vote for the superior party therefore increases that partys probability
of winning by the following amount,
Pr (P+) = 1
2
Pr (a = b) +
1
2
Pr (a = b+ 1) (18)
which is the standard probability of being pivotal (event P+). Similarly, the prob-
ability with which a vote for the inferior party is pivotal (event P ) is given by the
following.
Pr (P ) = 1
2
Pr (a = b) +
1
2
Pr (b = a+ 1) (19)
A pivotal vote for the party with the superior policy position increases utility from
zero to one (a change of 1) and a pivotal vote for the inferior party decreases utility
from one to zero (a change of  1). Outside of these pivotal events, a vote does not
change the policy outcome, and so does not impact utility; accordingly, the expected
benet (9) of voting reduces to the following.
Eu (q) =
1
2
(1 + q) Pr (P+)  1
2
(1  q) Pr (P ) (20)
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Since pivot probabilities are positive, (20) increases in q, and is positive if and
only if q exceeds the following threshold.
 br =
Pr (P )  Pr (P+)
Pr (P ) + Pr (P+) (21)
In other words, the best response to  is a quality threshold strategy, with quality
threshold given by (21): a voter votes if his expertise exceeds  br, and abstains oth-
erwise. In particular, if his peers follow a quality threshold strategy with arbitrary
quality threshold  then a voters best response is another quality threshold strategy,
with quality threshold  br. Accordingly, (17) can be reinterpreted as an implicit
function from the compact interval [0; 1] of possible thresholds into itself. The con-
tinuity of (4) through (9) and (18) through (20) imply that  br () is continuous in
 , so a xed point   =  br ( ) exists by Brouwers theorem, and characterizes a
quality threshold strategy  =  that is its own best response, thus constituting a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The denominator of (21) is positive, and from (18) and (19), the numerator is
proportional to the following.
Pr (a = b+ 1)  Pr (b = a+ 1) =
1X
k=0
[Pr (k + 1; k)  Pr (k; k + 1)]
From (6), the bracketed expression can be rewritten as follows.
e n+nk+1+
(k + 1)!
e n nk 
k!
  e
 n+nk+
k!
e n nk+1 
(k + 1)!
=
e n+ n nk+n
k
 
k! (k + 1)!
(n+   n )
=
e n+ n nk+n
k
 
k! (k + 1)!
n (v+   v )
As noted above, v+ > v  for any strategy in which a positive fraction of the electorate
votes, so the nal di¤erence in parentheses is positive, implying that the entire ex-
pression is positive, as is the numerator of (21). That  br > 0 for any best response
implies that   > 0 in equilibrium, as well, as claimed.
If  is strictly between 0 and 1 then the electoral rule is a hybrid of marginal
voting and pivotal voting then the expected benet of voting is merely the weighted
average of the expected benets above.
Eu (q) =
1
2
(1 + q) [ (+) + (1  ) Pr (P+)] 1
2
(1  q) [ ( ) + (1  ) Pr (P )]
As in the cases of  = 0 and  = 1, this di¤erence increases in q, and is positive if
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and only if q exceeds the following threshold.
 br =
 (   +) + (1  ) [Pr (P )  Pr (P+)]
 (+ +  ) + (1  ) [Pr (P+) + Pr (P )] (22)
In other words, the best response to  is again a quality threshold strategy, this time
with quality threshold given by (22). In particular, the best response to a qual-
ity threshold strategy with arbitrary quality threshold  is another quality threshold
strategy, with quality threshold  br, so (17) can be reinterpreted as an implicit func-
tion from the compact interval [0; 1] of possible thresholds into itself. The continuity
of (4) through (20) (and of + and  ) imply that  br () is continuous in  , so
a xed point   =  br ( ) exists by Brouwers theorem, and characterizes a quality
threshold strategy  =  that is its own best response, thus constituting a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. Clearly, (22) lies between (17) and (21), which are both positive
for any  . This implies that  br () is positive, and therefore that the xed point  
is positive, as well.
Lemma 1 If voting follows a quality threshold strategy  with quality threshold  < 1
then the following hold for any n.
Ea;b (+) =
v 
nv2
+
n
 
v2+   v2 
  2v 
2nv2
e nv (23)
Ea;b ( ) =
v+
nv2
+
n
 
v2    v2+
  2v+
2nv2
e nv (24)
Proof of Lemma 1. The expected vote share of the superior party can be written
as follows,
Ea;b [+ (a; b)] =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
e nv
na+
a!
nb 
b!
+ (a; b)
=
1
2
e nv + e nv
1X
a=1
1X
b=0
na+
a!
nb 
b!

a
a+ b

=
1
2
e nv + e nv
1X
a=1
"
1
(a  1)!
na+
na 
1X
b=0
na+b 
b! (a+ b)
#
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where the second equality follows because + (0; 0) = 12 . Di¤erentiating and inte-
grating the inner summand as follows,
1X
b=0
na+b 
b! (a+ b)
=
1X
b=0
Z n 
0
d
dt

ta+b
b!
1
a+ b

dt
=
Z n 
0
1X
b=0

ta+b 1
b!

dt
=
Z n 
0
ta 1etdt
this reduces further to the following.
Ea;b [+ (a; b)] =
1
2
e nv + e nv
n+
n 
Z n 
0
1X
a=1

n+
n  t
a 1
(a  1)! e
tdt
=
1
2
e nv + e nv
v+
v 
Z n 
0
e

v+
v  t

etdt
=
1
2
e nv + e nv
v+
v 
Z n 
0
e
v
v  tdt
=
1
2
e nv + e nv
v+
v
(env   1)
=
v+
v
+
v    v+
2v
e nv (25)
If a citizen votes for the party with the superior platform, this increases the
expected vote share to the following.
Ea;b [+ (a+ 1; b)] =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
e nv

na+
a!

nb 
b!

a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
= e nv
1X
a=0
"
a+ 1
a!
na+
na+1 
1X
b=0
na+b+1 
b! (a+ b+ 1)
#
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Di¤erentiating and integrating as before, this reduces further as follows.
= e nv
1X
a=0
a+ 1
a!
na+
na+1 
Z n 
0
taetdt
= e nv
Z n 
0
1X
a=0

a
a!
na+
na+1 
ta +
1
a!
na+
na+1 
ta

etdt.
= e nv
Z n 
0
264n+
n2 
t
1X
a=1

n+
n  t
a 1
(a  1)! +
1
n 
1X
a=0

n+
n  t
a
a!
375 etdt
= e nv
Z n 
0

n+
n2 
te

n+
n  t

+
1
n 
e

n+
n  t

etdt
=
n+
n2 
e nv
Z n 
0
te
v
v  tdt+
1
n 
e nv
Z n 
0
e
v
v  tdt
Integrating by parts, this reduces to the following.
n+
n2 
e nv

v 
v
env   0  v 
v
Z n 
0
e
v
v  t

+
1
nv
e nv (env   1)
=
v+
nv2 
e nv

nv2 e
nv
v
  v
2
 
v2
(env   1)

+
1
nv
 
1  e nv
=

v+
v
  v+
nv2
+
1
nv

+

v+
nv2
  1
nv

e nv
=
nvv+ + v 
nv2
  v 
nv2
e nv (26)
The di¤erence Ea;b (+) between (25) and (26) is then given by (23). A symmetric
derivation shows Ea;b ( ) to be equal to (24).
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Proof of Proposition 2. For a quality threshold strategy with arbitrary quality
threshold  2 [0; 1], (4) and (5) reduces so that expected vote shares v+ and v  and
turnout rate v can be written as follows,
v+ () = p+ I
Z 1

1
2
(1 + q) dF (q)
= p+
1
2
I [1  F ()] [1 +m ()] (27)
v  () = p+ I
Z 1

1
2
(1  q) dF (q)
= p+
1
2
I [1  F ()] [1 m ()] (28)
v () = 2p+ I [1  F ()]
where m () = E (qjq > ) denotes the average expertise among citizens who actually
vote. Using these, the likelihood ratio  () of a correct vote to an incorrect vote can
then be written as follows,
 () =
v+ ()
v  ()
=
K + [1  F ()] [1 +m ()]
K + [1  F ()] [1 m ()] (29)
in terms of the ratio K = 2p
I
of partisan to independent voters.
Given these preliminaries, we establish the proposition as in Proposition 1, rst
for the case of pure marginal voting,  = 1, then for the case of pure pivotal voting,
 = 0, and nally for the intermediate cases  2 (0; 1). For  = 1, the proof
of Proposition 1 shows that the best response to a quality threshold strategy with
quality threshold  is another quality threshold strategy, with quality threshold given
by (17). Equivalently,  br solves the following,
1 + 
1   =
Ea;b ( )
Ea;b (+)
=
2v+ +

n
 
v2+   v2 
  2v  e nv
2v  + [n (v2    v2+)  2v+] e nv
(30)
where the arguments of v+, v , and v are supressed for brevity, and where the second
equality follows from technical Lemma 1.30 As n grows large, the right-hand side
of this expression converges simply to (29). Since (30) is continuous both in  and
in n, the limit  1 of any sequence (

n) of solutions to (30) must therefore solve the
30Lemma 1 only applies if  < 1; if  = 1 then Ea;b (+) = + (0; 0) = 12 and Ea;b ( ) =
  (0; 0) = 12 , so
Ea;b( )
Ea;b(+)
= 1 and  br () = 0 for any n.
7
following, simpler equation.
 () =
1 + 
1   (31)
From (29) it is clear that the left-hand side of (31) exceeds the right-hand side at
 = 0, implying that  1 > 0 as claimed in (1).
As  increases from zero to one, the right-hand side of (31) increases from one to
innity. For any p, di¤erentiating (27) and (28) with respect to  yields
v0+ =  
I
2
(1 + ) f ()
v0  =  
I
2
(1  ) f ()
and di¤erentiating (29) therefore yields
0 () =
v0+ () v  ()  v+ () v0  ()
v  ()
2 =
I
2
f ()
  (1 + ) v  () + (1  ) v+ ()
v  ()
2
which is positive if and only if the left-hand side of (31) exceeds the right-hand
side. In other words, any solution to (31) uniquely maximizes  () (and therefore
()
1+()
= v+()
v+()+v () = + ()). There is exactly one such solution. If p = K = 0
then (29) reduces to  () = 1+m()
1 m() and the solution to (31) requires m () =  , which
is uniquely satised for  1 = 1. If p > 0 then (29) exceeds the right-hand side of
(31) for  = 0 but not for  = 1, so the solution  1 is strictly between 0 and 1. This
establishes claim (2). (29) also decreases in K (and therefore in p) for all  , implying
that the solution  1 to (31) strictly decreases in K (and therefore in p), as claimed
in (3).
Claim (4) follows because  () increases with F , as shown below. Since the
right-hand side of (31) increases in  , an increase in the left-hand side for all  yields
a higher solution  1 than before. In other words, 

1 increases in F . To see that
 () increases with F , rst rewrite (29) as follows,
 () =
K +
R 1

(1 + q) f (q) dq
K +
R 1

(1  q) f (q) dq =
R 1
0
 + (q) f (q) dqR 1
0
   (q) f (q) dq
(32)
in terms of  + (q) = K + 1q (1 + q) and  
 
 (q) = K + 1q (1  q), where 1q is
the indicator function that equals one if q   and zero otherwise. For any K,  + (q)
and    (q) are non-negative and respectively increasing and decreasing functions of
q. Written this way, it can be shown that  increases in F . To see this, write (32)
for distribution functions F <MLRP G as F and G. The di¤erence G   F can
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then be written as follows,R 1
0
 + (q) g (q) dqR 1
0
   (q) g (q) dq
>
R 1
0
 + (q) f (q) dqR 1
0
   (q) f (q) dq
which is proportional to the following,Z 1
0
Z 1
0
 + (q)  
 
 (q
0) f (q0) g (q) dqdq0  
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
 + (q)  
 
 (q
0) f (q) g (q0) dqdq0
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
 + (q)  
 
 (q
0) [f (q) g (q0)  f (q0) g (q)] dqdq0
=
Z Z
q>
 + (q)  
 
 (~q) [f (~q) g (q)  f (q) g (~q)] dqd~q
+
Z Z
>q
 + (q)  
 
 (~q) [f (~q) g (q)  f (q) g (~q)] dqd~q
=
Z Z
q>

 + (q)  
 
 (~q)   + (~q)    (q)

[f (~q) g (q)  f (q) g (~q)] dqd~q
=
Z Z
q>
   (q)  
 
 (~q)

 + (q)
   (q)
   
+
 (~q)
   (~q)

f (q) f (~q)

g (q)
f (q)
  g (~q)
f (~q)

dqd~q
where the third equality follows from reversing the labels of q and ~q in the second
double integral. Since  + and
g(q)
f(q)
both increase in q and since    decreases in q,
this expression is positive, implying that G > F , as claimed.
Having established claims (1) through (4) for the case of  = 1, we turn now to the
case of  = 0, following the arguments of Theorem 4 of McMurray (2013), generalized
to accommodate p > 0. Myerson (2000) provides a useful preliminary result, which
is that pivot probabilities can be written as follows (again suppressing the argument
of v+ of v ), where h1 (n) and h2 (n) both approach one as n grows large.
Pr (P+) = e
 n(pv+ pv )2
4
p
n
p
v+v 
p
v+ +
p
v p
v+
h1 (n) (33)
Pr (P ) = e
 n(pv+ pv )2
4
p
n
p
v+v 
p
v+ +
p
v p
v 
h2 (n) (34)
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Using these formulas (and since v+ () 6= v  () for any quality threshold strategy),
the best-response condition (21) converges to the following as n grows large.
 =
p
v+ () 
p
v  ()p
v+ () +
p
v  ()
Like (17), this can be written in terms of the likelihood ratio  (), as follows.
 () =
v+ ()
v  ()
=

1 + 
1  
2
(35)
The limit  1 of any sequence 

n of equilibrium thresholds must be a solution to this
equation.
As before, the limiting equilibrium condition (35) can be rewritten using (29), and
solved for K, as follows.
1  F ()


(1 +  2)
2
m ()  

= K (36)
As we show below, the left-hand side of (36) starts at +1 for  = 0 and decreases
with  until it reaches its minimum at some negative level for a unique minimizer
 2 (0; 1), then increases again to zero for  = 1. That the left-hand side is strictly
decreasing when positive implies that (36) has a unique solution  1 for any K  0,
which is hence decreasing in K and therefore in p. Moreover, for p = 0 = K it
satises 0 <  1 <  < 1. This establishes claims (1) through (3). Claim (4) follows
just as in the case of pure marginal voting: the right-hand side of (35) increases with
 , and an increase in F raises the left-hand side, thereby increasing the solution  1.
To see that the left-hand side of (36) decreases on [0;  ] for some  < 1, di¤erentiate
it to yield the following.
1   2
2
[1  F ()]

f ()
1  F ()  
m ()
 2

(37)
To obtain the above we di¤erentiated m () = 1
1 F ()
R 1

qf (q) dq using the Leibnitz
formula, as follows.
m0 () =
  [1  F ()] f () + f () R 1

qf (q) dq
[1  F ()]2 =
f ()
1  F () [m ()   ]
It is clear from the denition of m () = E (qjq  ) that it always exceeds  . Since
f () is log-concave, Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show further that m0 () < 1
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and that f()
1 F () increases in  . This former implies that
m()

decreases in  , the
latter implies that the di¤erence in parentheses in (37) increases in  , and is therefore
negative and positive to the left and the right of some unique minimizer  2 (0; 1),
respectively.
Proposition 3 states below that  1 is the same for any  2 (0; 1]. Thus, the
proofs of claims (1) through (4) for the case of  = 1 apply to intermediate cases
 2 (0; 1), as well.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equation (22) gives the equilibrium condition for a general
model with arbitrary  2 [0; 1] and nite n. According to Lemma 1, the marginal
changes + and   in policy associated with additional votes for the superior
and inferior parties, respectively, can be rewritten as (23) and (24). According to
Myerson (2000), pivot probabilities Pr (P+) and Pr (P ) can be written as (33) and
(34). (22) can thus be written as follows (once again suppressing the argument of
v+ of v ).
1 + 
1   =


v+
nv2
+
n(v2  v2+) 2v+
2nv2
e nv

+ (1  )

e n(
p
v+ pv )2
4
p
n
p
v+v 
p
v++
p
v p
v  h1 (n)



v 
nv2
+
n(v2+ v2 ) 2v 
2nv2
e nv

+ (1  )

e n(
p
v+ pv )2
4
p
n
p
v+v 
p
v++
p
v p
v+
h2 (n)
 (38)
For any  > 0, exponential terms vanish more quickly than other terms, so this
expression converges simply to (31) in the limit as n grows large. This establishes
the equality in the proposition.
For  = 0, equation (38) instead converges to (35), which is equivalent to (11),
while (31) is equivalent to (10). As the proof Proposition 2 shows, the latter has
a unique solution  1 (p; 1; F ), which also maximizes its left-hand side. If f is not
log-concave, Equation (11) may have multiple solutions. However, the right-hand
sides of (10) and (11) are the same, and the left-hand side of (11) is no greater than
the left-hand side of (10). For any  >  1 (p; 1; F ), therefore, the left-hand side of
(11) is smaller than the left-hand side of (10), which is smaller than the right-hand
side of either equation, and is therefore not a solution to (11).
Proof of Proposition 4. Section 2 equates utility u (x) = x with the policy
outcome, which for generic  is given in (1). Expected utility can therefore be
written as follows, in terms of the numbers a and b of votes for the superior and
inferior party.
E [u (x)] = 
a
a+ b
+ (1  )

Pr (a > b) +
1
2
Pr (a = b)

(39)
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For any , Proposition 1 characterizes equilibrium in nite elections as a quality
threshold strategy, with expected vote shares given by (27) and (28). The realized
numbers a and b of votes for the superior and inferior parties are independent Poisson
random variables, with respective means nv+ () and nv  ().
For any n, Proposition 1 characterizes equilibrium voting as a quality threshold
strategy, with quality threshold  n. If  = 0 then any limit point 

1 of f ng must
solve Equation (11). As n grows large, the ratio a
b
of actual votes for either party
approaches in probability the ratio v+(
1)
v (1)
=  ( 1) of expected vote shares. Since
 () > 1 for any  , the probability that a
b
> 1 approaches one, implying that welfare
approaches u1 = 1. If  > 0 then f ng has a unique limit point, which must solve
Equation (10). In that case, a
a+b
converges in probability to u1 =
(1)
1+(1)
, which
increases with  ( 1). The proof of Proposition 2 shows that  (

1) increases with
F and decreases with p, implying that u1 increases with F and decreases with p,
as well. If p = K = 0 then (29) reduces to  () = 1+m()
1 m() , so a solution to (31)
requires m () =  , which is true if and only if  1 = 1. If p =
1
2
(so that I = 0)
then (27) and (28) reduce to v+ () = v  () = p for any  , so (29) reduces to
 () = 1 and the unique solution to (31) is  1 = 0, implying that welfare approaches
u1 =
(1)
1+(1)
= 1
2
, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. With a generalized policy function, the expected benet
of voting (9) can be rewritten as follows for the case of  = 1,
Eu (q) = Ea;b

1
2
(1 + q) + (a; b) +
1
2
(1  q)   (a; b)

in terms of the di¤erence in policy + (a; b) =  (a+ 1; b)    (a; b) induced by
one additional vote for the superior party A and the policy di¤erence   (a; b) =
 (a; b+ 1)    (a; b) induced by one additional vote for party B. By monotonic-
ity, these di¤erences are positive and negative, respectively. Given the symmetry
condition, the latter di¤erence can also be written as follows,
  (a; b) = [1   (b+ 1; a)]  [1   (b; a)]
=  (b; a)   (b+ 1; a)
=  + (b; a)
in terms of the positive impact of a correct vote when there are b votes for party A
and a votes for party B.
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Since+ (a; b) and+ (b; a) are both positive (by monotonicity), (9) is positive
if and only if q exceeds the following threshold,
 br =
Ea;b [+ (b; a)]  Ea;b [+ (a; b)]
Ea;b [+ (a; b)] + Ea;b [+ (b; a)]
(40)
which generalizes (17). In particular, the best response to a quality threshold strategy
with quality threshold  is another quality threshold strategy, with quality threshold
 br. Since Pr (a; b) is continuous in  , so is Eu (q), and therefore  br (), even if
 (a; b) is not continuous in a and b. A xed point   =  br ( ) therefore exists by
Brouwers theorem, which denes a quality threshold strategy that is its own best
response. This establishes equilibrium existence.
The denominator of (40) is positive, and the numerator reduces as follows.
X
a;b
[+ (b; a) + (a; b)] e
 n(v+ v )na+bva+v
b
 
a!b!
=
X
a>b
[+ (b; a) + (a; b)] e
 n(v+ v )na+bva+v
b
 
a!b!
+
X
a<b
[+ (b; a) + (a; b)] e
 n(v+ v )na+bva+v
b
 
a!b!
Relabeling variables in the second summation yields the following.
X
a>b
[+ (b; a) + (a; b)] e
 n(v+ v )na+bva+v
b
 
a!b!
+
X
b<a
[+ (a; b) + (b; a)] e
 n(v+ v )na+bvb+v
a
 
a!b!
=
X
a>b
[+ (b; a) + (a; b)] e
 n(v+ v )na+bvb+v
b
 
a!b!
 
va b+   va b 

Monotonicity and the underdog property together imply that + (a; b) < + (b; a)
if and only if a > b. This, together with the fact that n+ = nv+ > nv  = n , implies
that the above expression is strictly positive, and therefore that  br is positive. That
the best-response threshold is strictly positive implies that any equilibrium threshold
is positive as well, and a positive fraction of the electorate therefore prefer to abstain
in equilibrium.
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